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THE BEAST OF UNDUE BURDEN: 
EVALUATING THE BURDEN ON THE 
PHYSICIAN IN PLANNED PARENTHOOD  
OF THE HEARTLAND V. HEINEMAN 
Abstract: On July 14, 2010, in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heine-
man, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska issued a prelimi-
nary injunction halting the implementation of a bill that would have im-
posed on abortion providers new requirements for obtaining informed 
consent. The court held that the new, more rigorous informed consent re-
quirements would have likely placed an undue burden on women seeking 
abortions. In doing so, the court implied that both the burden on the phy-
sician and on the patient were relevant to the undue burden analysis. This 
Comment argues that to determine whether a particular informed consent 
requirement places an undue burden on a woman’s ability to get an abor-
tion, courts should evaluate its effect on both the woman and the doctor. 
Introduction 
 In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Nebraska in 2010 issued a preliminary injunc-
tion against the enforcement of LB 594, a state legislative bill that im-
posed new and greater requirements on physicians for pre-abortion 
screening and counseling.1 The enjoined bill sought to broaden the 
scope of physicians’ responsibilities by providing new definitions for the 
“complications” and “risk factors” that physicians must discuss in order 
to obtain a patient’s informed consent; the bill also sought to create 
greater incentives for women to bring suit against abortion providers.2 
LB 594 redefined “complications” to include any adverse reaction— 
physical, psychological, or emotional—reported in any peer-reviewed 
journal.3 Similarly, “risk factor” was expanded to mean any factor, pub-
lished in any peer-reviewed journal, whether physical, psychological, 
emotional, demographic, or situational, associated with one or more 
                                                                                                                      
1 See 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031, 1038, 1050 (D. Neb. 2010); see also Stipulation to En-
try of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 2, Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 
724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (No. 4:10-cv-3122), 2010 WL 5758641; L.B. 594, 101st Leg. (Neb. 
2009), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/101/PDF/Intro/LB594.pdf. 
2 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1032–34. 
3 Id. at 1032–33; L.B. 594. 
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complications.4 Incentives to bring suit included making damages 
available for wrongful death of the fetus, putting the burden of proof 
on the physician, and allowing the woman to bring suit based on emo-
tional suffering, injury to reputation, and even humiliation.5 
 Although the scope of LB 594 made compliance a near impossibil-
ity for doctors, ensuring its likely invalidation, the court’s analysis of the 
burden placed on physicians represented a shift in abortion jurispru-
dence.6 The bill was similar to legislative attempts in other states to ef-
fectively prohibit abortion following the U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in 1992, and 
Gonzales v. Carhart, in 2007.7 In Casey, the Court held that a direct regu-
lation on women seeking abortions—in that case, a spousal consent re-
quirement—was unconstitutional, but changed the standard for evaluat-
ing regulations on abortion from strict scrutiny to an undue burden 
standard.8 Gonzales further loosened that standard, holding that a regu-
lation limiting physicians’ ability to perform intact dilations and evacua-
tions was not an undue burden on women, even though the blanket 
prohibition would affect access to those procedures.9 In Planned Parent-
hood of the Heartland, the Nebraska court found that LB 594’s restrictions 
would have created an undue burden for women seeking abortions, bas-
ing that determination not on direct limitations to women seeking abor-
tions, but on limitations to physicians and practitioners.10 
                                                                                                                      
4 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1032–33; L.B. 594. 
5 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1033–34; L.B. 594. 
6 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, 1038; L.B. 594. 
7 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145–46 (2007); Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); infra notes 46–59 and accompany-
ing text. In Casey, the Supreme Court stated that it was preserving the essential holding of 
Roe v. Wade, which it defined in three parts. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1972). First, the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right of a woman to have an 
abortion before viability, and the right to obtain it without undue interference from the 
state. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. Second, the state has the power to restrict abortions after vi-
ability provided the state makes exceptions when the woman’s life or health is in danger. 
Id. Third, the state has a legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in both the 
health of the woman and the life of the unborn child. Id. 
In Gonzales, the Court focused on the third part of the essential holding of Roe, as ar-
ticulated in Casey, further altering the standard articulated in Roe. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 
145–46. Although the Court reaffirmed that a state may not prohibit or impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to get an abortion, it held that a substantial obstacle to a wom-
an’s right to an abortion does not exist when the state only creates “regulations which do 
no more than create a structural mechanism by which the state . . . may express profound 
respect for the life of the unborn.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146. 
8 Casey, 505 U.S. at 887, 898. 
9 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146–47. 
10 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1032–34, 1038, 1042, 1046. 
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 In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, the court looked to the logi-
cal (rather than direct) effect of the restrictions, reasoning that legisla-
tion that puts an undue burden on physicians necessarily also creates 
an undue burden on women seeking abortions since such legislation 
would result in a loss of access to providers willing to perform the pro-
cedure.11 Therefore, increased obligations on physicians, such as re-
quirements to perform complex patient evaluations, or risks to physi-
cians, such as the danger of crippling litigation, could be an undue 
burden on the right to abortion if those obligations and risks prevent 
access to abortions.12 In making that determination, the court helped 
to close a logical gap left by previous cases and allowed for more robust 
judicial evaluation of abortion legislation.13 
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief summary of the provisions 
of the proposed statute LB 594 and the court’s evaluation of its purposes 
and effects.14 Part II provides a brief legal history of abortion jurispru-
dence to contextualize the decision reached in Planned Parenthood of the 
Heartland.15 Finally, Part III examines the court’s determination that LB 
594 would have likely placed an undue burden on women seeking abor-
tions, and argues that to determine whether a regulation places an un-
due burden on the constitutional right to abortion, courts should evalu-
ate the effect both on the physician and on the woman.16 
I. The U.S. District Court’s Evaluation of the Purposes  
and Effects of LB 594 
 In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Planned Parenthood and its 
medical director brought suit against the governor on behalf of its phy-
                                                                                                                      
11 See id. at 1032–34, 1046. 
12 See id. 
13 See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After 
Casey and Carhart, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 675 (2004) (discussing the undue burden stan-
dard, its ambiguity, and lack of guiding principles); Sarah Runels, Informed Consent Laws 
and the Constitution: Balancing State Interests with a Physician’s First Amendment Rights and a 
Woman’s Due Process Rights, 26 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 185 (2009) (criticizing 
courts’ failure to employ proper constitutional framework and ambiguity of substantial 
obstacle test); Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say “Ideology”: Physicians 
and the First Amendment, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155 (2009) (discussing legislation based on 
ideology, lack of a clear standard on compelled physician speech, and the openness and 
ambiguity of the undue burden standard). 
14 See infra notes 17–45 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 46–71 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 72–84 and accompanying text. 
232 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
sicians, employees, and future patients.17 Planned Parenthood sought to 
enjoin LB 594 from taking effect and expanding Nebraska’s existing 
abortion statute, which already contained an informed consent provi-
sion with thirty-six discrete requirements.18 The bill expanded the defi-
nition of a “risk factor” that a physician was required to disclose to the 
patient, defining it as “any factor, including any physical, psychological, 
emotional, demographic, or situational factor . . . published in any peer-
reviewed journals indexed by the United States National Library of 
Medicine’s search services.”19 Under the bill, physicians would have 
been required before each abortion to make a written evaluation of the 
pregnant woman, identifying any risk factors applicable to that pa-
tient.20 In addition, for each risk factor identified, the physician would 
have been required to inform the patient of the likelihood and nature 
of each risk in as much detail as a reasonable person would find mate-
ri 21 
 The practical effect of the risk factor requirements was to place a 
seemingly impossible burden on physicians and abortion providers.
al.
blished over many dec-
es
                                                                                                                     
22 
To comply with LB 594, providers would have been required to identify 
and review thousands of articles, including those with dubious support 
from the medical and scientific community, pu
ad , on online databases not easily searched.23 
 Beyond the vague and exacting requirements for informed con-
sent, the bill also provided strong financial incentives for a woman who 
later regretted having an abortion to sue her physician.24 The bill 
would have allowed the negligent failure of a physician to comply with 
informed consent standards to serve as a basis for damages, including 
wrongful death of the fetus, and attorneys’ fees.25 The bill further pro-
 
17 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 (D. 
Neb. 2010). 
18 Id. at 1031, 1032. 
19 Id. at 1032. 
20 Id. at 1032–33. 
21 Id. at 1033. 
22 See id. at 1038; First Amended Complaint at 5, Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 
724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (No. 4:10-cv-3122). 
23 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1038; First Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 22, at 5. 
24 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1033–34, 1045. 
25 Id. The bill’s provision allowing wrongful death damages for the abortion of a fetus 
was consistent with Nebraska’s wrongful death statute which creates an action for “the 
death of a person, including an unborn child in utero at any stage of gestation, . . . caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person, company, or corporation.” Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 30–809 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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vided that the burden of proof would be on the physician to demon-
strate that “the pregnant woman had sufficient reflection time, given 
her age, maturity, emotional state, and mental capacity, to comprehend 
t in 
lac
consent standards for abortion procedures were significantly higher 
                                                                                                                     
and consider such information.”26 
 The district court held that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in 
their challenge of the bill under their liberty-and-privacy interest, void 
for vagueness, and First Amendment claims.27 The court reasoned that 
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their liberty-and-privacy interest 
claims because the Fourteenth Amendment had long been recognized 
to “encompass a right to be free from undue governmental interference 
in matters that are intensely private . . . .”28 Furthermore, although the 
court recognized that previous cases authorized legislation in the inter-
est of protecting potential life, it stated that “liberty may not be inter-
fered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest.”29 The 
court further opined that a legislative determination is not conclusive, 
and that the courts’ duty is to ensure that the legislature does not im-
pose an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.30 Such a bur-
den would be created if the purpose or effect of the statute was to pu
p e a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to get an abortion.31 
 LB 594 provided that its purposes were to protect the well-being of 
women and to set a minimum standard for informed consent in pre-
abortion screening adequate to protect the health needs of women.32 In 
evaluating the purpose of the bill, the court held that its likely purpose 
was to place a substantial obstacle before a woman seeking an abor-
tion.33 The court stated that the legislative purpose did not explain the 
vast discrepancies between consent requirements for abortion and con-
sent requirements for other medical procedures.34 The new informed 
 
26 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 
27 Id. at 1042. 
28 Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). 
29 Id. at 1043 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see infra note 62 
and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s approval in Roe and Casey of the states’ 
interest in protecting fetal life). 
30 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
31 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 
(1992); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, 1044–46. 
32 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
33 Id. at 1043–44. 
34 Id. at 1044; cf. infra note 81 and accompanying text (giving examples of other states’ 
informed consent statutes). 
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than those for other medical procedures, even those with greater threats 
to the physical, mental and emotional health of the patient.35 
 The court determined that the legislature’s primary concern was 
not to ensure that women have enough information to make fully-
informed decisions to undergo medical procedures.36 That conclusion 
was based, in part, on the fact that the bill offered substantial financial 
incentives to litigate even when the woman did not regret her decision 
to have an abortion, given that her regret would be presumed.37 The 
court reasoned that the provision’s purpose was to minimize the avail-
ability of abortion by incentivizing lawsuits.38 The court concluded that 
“the only sensible construction” of the consent requirements was that 
the legislature “intended to place a substantial, if not insurmountable, 
obstacle in the path of any woman seeking an abortion in Nebraska.”39 
 Furthermore, the court stated that even if it were to assume that 
the purpose of the statute was to protect the health of women, the plain-
tiffs would still likely succeed on the merits of their claims because the 
effect of the statute would be to place insurmountable obstacles in the 
path of women seeking abortions.40 Because the bill would have ex-
posed physicians to a risk of crippling litigation and increased their re-
sponsibilities, fewer physicians would have been willing to perform 
abortions.41 The lack of access to physicians willing to perform an abor-
tion would have formed a substantial obstacle to women seeking abor-
tions as real as a direct prohibition on abortion.42 
                                                                                                                      
35 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1044. In contrast to LB 594, 
Nebraska’s Medical Liability Act defines informed consent in a mere two sentences: 
Informed consent shall mean consent to a procedure based on information 
which would ordinarily be provided to the patient under like circumstances 
by health care providers engaged in a similar practice in the locality or in sim-
ilar localities. Failure to obtain informed consent shall include failure to ob-
tain any express or implied consent for any operation, treatment, or proce-
dure in a case in which a reasonably prudent health care provider in the 
community or similar communities would have obtained an express or im-
plied consent for such operation, treatment, or procedure under similar cir-
cumstances. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2816 (2009). 
36 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1044–46. 
37 Id. at 1045. 
38 Id. at 1045, 1046. 
39 Id. at 1046. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. at 1038, 1046. 
42 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. 
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 Thus, although the vague and stringent conditions imposed by LB 
594 made literal compliance an impossibility, Planned Parenthood of the 
Heartland marked an important reevaluation of the undue burden stan-
dard.43 Previous cases focused on whether regulations placed a direct 
and substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.44 
In contrast, Planned Parenthood of the Heartland encompassed in its analy-
sis not only undue burden on the woman, but also on the physician.45 
II. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland in the Context of 
Shifting Abortion Jurisprudence 
 By abandoning the strict scrutiny standard articulated in1973 in 
Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1992 case of Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, allowed state legislatures to 
enact regulations restricting abortion indirectly.46 Weakening the stan-
dard of scrutiny applicable to abortion rights precipitated a flurry of 
legislative action.47 In light of Casey and subsequent decisions, such as 
the Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart, states have enacted new 
subtle but significant restrictions on abortion, including heightened 
informed consent requirements like the one at issue in Planned Parent-
hood of the Heartland.48 Although they regulate abortion only indirectly, 
                                                                                                                      
43 See id. at 1032–34, 1044, 1046; see generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
44 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141, 147 (2007) (holding that regulations lim-
iting physicians’ practice and ability to perform the intact dilation and evacuation proce-
dure was not an undue burden on women); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921, 930 
(2000) (holding that a limit on a physician’s ability to perform certain dilation and evacua-
tion procedures was an undue burden because the lack of a health exception would have 
put an undue burden on women for whom that procedure was safer); Casey, 505 U.S. at 
882, 887, 893–94 (holding that certain direct regulations on women, such as a spousal 
consent requirement, were an undue burden). 
45 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. 
46 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 
878 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973); Borgmann, supra note 13, at 681–85. 
In Casey, the Court changed the standard from strict scrutiny to an “undue burden” test, a 
doctrinal change that was met with criticism within and outside the Court. See Casey, 505 
U.S. at 985–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden 
Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2025, 2026 
(1994) (proposing a new methodology for application of the Casey standard and under-
scoring the weakness of the standard). 
47 See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
48 See An Overview of Abortion Laws, St. Policies in Brief (Guttmacher Inst., New York, 
N.Y. & Wash., D.C.), Oct. 1, 2010, at 1, 2–3, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/state 
center/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned 
Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010); Thad-
deus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Informed Consent, 21 J. Clinical Ethics 72 (2010) (sum-
marizing recent legislation on informed consent requirements in abortion statutes). 
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informed consent requirements are still powerful tools to advance sub-
stantive anti-abortion policy goals.49 
 Originally, the idea behind informed consent was to counteract a 
tradition of physician paternalism whereby physicians dictated, rather 
than discussed, medical treatment.50 To that end, informed consent 
requirements limited outside influence by requiring that physicians 
offer objective information on advantages and disadvantages of differ-
ent treatment options.51 Typically, informed consent for a medical pro-
cedure requires three elements: first, a physician must communicate all 
necessary information to the patient; second, the patient must under-
stand the information provided; and third, the patient must consent to 
the treatment.52 
 Despite the anti-paternalistic purpose of informed consent stat-
utes, legislatures have recently used consent and disclosure require-
ments to influence women’s decisions to obtain abortions.53 In addi-
tion to informed consent statutes for general medical treatment, most 
states have also enacted special informed consent statutes targeting 
abortion procedures.54 Informed consent statutes for abortion proce-
dures differ significantly from those for other medical procedures.55 
Abortion providers are often required to detail the procedure graphi-
cally; many states have a two-visit requirement;56 several statutes require 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Robbins, supra note 13, at 170, 178. 
50 Amanda McMurray Roe, Note, Not-So-Informed Consent: Using the Doctor-Patient Rela-
tionship to Promote State-Supported Outcomes, 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 205, 208 (2009). 
51 Id. at 209–10; see Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 506 (N.J. 1988) (“[Informed con-
sent] is essentially a negligence concept, predicated on the duty of a physician to disclose 
to a patient such information as will enable the patient to make an evaluation of the na-
ture of the treatment and of any attendant substantial risks, as well as of available options 
in the form of alternative therapies.”). 
52 See L.M. Cirando, Note, Informed Choice and Population Policy: Do the Population Policies 
of China and the United States Respect and Ensure Women’s Right to Informed Choice?, 19 Ford-
ham Int'l L.J. 611, 631 (1995). 
53 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(5)(b) (2008) (stating that the stat-
ute’s purpose was to “[p]rotect unborn children from a woman’s uninformed decision to 
have an abortion”); see also Robbins, supra note 13, at 159, 161–62, 174 (discussing the use 
of informed consent as a way of preventing abortion and furthering a specific ideology). 
54 See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. See generally An Overview of Abortion 
Laws, supra note 48; Pope, supra note 48. 
55 Compare infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text, with infra note 81 and accompa-
nying text. 
56 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(1) (requiring a woman to visit a phy-
sician at least twenty-four hours before the procedure); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-33(1)(a) 
(2009) (same). 
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that physicians disclose risks that are not scientifically proven;57 some 
require that doctors give truthful, but manipulative, non-relevant 
facts;58 and certain provisions require that physicians selectively dis-
seminate ideological information on abortion.59 
                                                                                                                     
 After Casey, states may enact regulations promoting the health or 
safety of a woman seeking an abortion as long as the regulations do not 
place a substantial obstacle in her path to an abortion before viability.60 
Furthermore, a regulation that increases the cost or availability of med-
ical care, as long as it has a valid purpose, will not be invalidated be-
cause it incidentally makes an abortion more difficult to obtain.61 Al-
though the Casey Court purported to reaffirm the holding in Roe, its 
altered analytical approach changed the character of the rights pro-
tected by that holding.62 Casey invited legislative reactions such as the 
 
57 Compare, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(a)(ii) (“By twenty weeks ges-
tation, the unborn child has the physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is 
evidence that by twenty weeks gestation unborn children seek to evade certain stimuli in a 
manner which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted to be a response to pain.”), 
with Stuart W.G. Derbyshire, Can Fetuses Feel Pain?, 332 Brit. Med. J., 909, 912 (2006) 
(“The neural circuitry for pain in fetuses is immature . . . [and] the developmental proc-
esses necessary for the mindful experience of pain are not yet developed.”); compare also 
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (requiring disclosure of the risk of breast cancer), 
with Summary Report: Early Reproductive Events and Breast Cancer Workshop, Nat’l Cancer 
Inst., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/ere-workshop-report (last updated Jan. 12, 
2010) (stating as well-established fact that abortion is not associated with an increased risk 
of breast cancer). 
58 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(b) (requiring state publication of 
“the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week 
gestational increments . . . including color pictures or drawings.”); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-
02.1-02.1(b) (2009) (“The majority of the pictures included in the booklet must be full 
color photograph-style images and the pictures must contain the dimensions of the fetus 
and must be realistic and appropriate for the stage of pregnancy depicted.”). 
59 See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-02(6)(a)(2) (“The abortion will terminate the 
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being . . . .”); see also Runels, supra note 13, 
at 187. 
60 505 U.S. at 873, 874. 
61 Id. at 874. 
62 See id. at 878. In contrast to Casey’s undue burden test, the trimester framework in 
Roe provided that a woman has a right to an abortion during her first trimester without 
inference from the state. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63. During the second trimester, until viabil-
ity, a state could regulate the abortion procedure to the point that it reasonably relates to 
the preservation of maternal health. Id. at 163. During the third trimester, after viability, a 
state could proscribe abortion except in cases when it is necessary to preserve the life of 
the mother. Id. at 163–64. Furthermore, beyond changing the standard for scrutiny, Casey 
also allowed for increased consideration of states’ interest in the protection of fetal life. See 
505 U.S. at 873. 
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informed consent statutes because it reframed the substance and ex-
tent of the right to abortion.63 
 The Court in Casey did not define its undue burden standard, nor 
did it give any objective parameters to help lower courts assess state 
regulation of abortion.64 After finding Pennsylvania’s spousal notice 
provision unconstitutional under the undue burden test, the Court ap-
proved that state’s twenty-four hour waiting period and informed con-
sent statute.65 The Court held that the informed consent statute was 
permissible as long as its required disclosures were “truthful and not 
misleading.”66 
 More recently, in Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that a state 
prohibition on a specific abortion procedure, intact dilation and evacua-
tion (“D&E”), passed the undue burden test.67 Gonzales focused on the 
third part of Casey’s holding that the state has a legitimate interest in 
both the health of the pregnant woman and that of the fetus.68 Al-
though the Court in an earlier case, Stenberg v. Carhart, had struck down 
a blanket prohibition on D&E because the statute lacked a health ex-
ception, the Court in Gonzales stated that a “moral, medical, and ethical 
consensus” had been reached that D&E “is never medically necessary 
and should be prohibited.”69 After concluding that intact D&E is never 
needed to protect the health of a pregnant woman, the Gonzales Court 
upheld the statute without a health exception, and without overruling 
Stenberg.70 Allowing the blanket prohibition, the Court further opened 
the door for states to restrict abortions by aiming legislation directly at 
doctors.71 
III. Changing the Standard: Evaluating Undue Burdens on 
Both the Physician and the Woman 
 When evaluating whether a regulation places a substantial obstacle 
before women seeking abortions, courts should follow the path of the 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145–46; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Borgmann, supra note 13, at 
681. 
64 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77; id. at 985–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
65 See id. at 882, 886, 887, 893–94. 
66 Id. at 882. 
67 550 U.S. at 164, 173. 
68 Id. at 146. 
69 Id. at 141; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000). 
70 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133, 141, 156. 
71 See id. at 173–74, 181, 182, 186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the safety bene-
fits of intact D&E, the Act’s lack of a legitimate policy interest, the Court’s failure to follow 
precedent, and the blurring of the line for when a state can intervene). 
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district court in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland and evaluate both 
the burden on the woman and the burden on the physician.72 Doing so 
will help courts evaluate whether the regulation does, in fact, place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of obtaining an abortion.73 It will also 
serve as an important counterbalance to ever-shifting abortion juris-
prudence which has allowed more restrictive regulation without over-
ruling previous cases.74 
 First, the direct causal relationship between a woman’s ability to 
seek an abortion and a physician’s ability to provide one ensures that 
any statute that imposes an undue burden on a provider’s ability to per-
form abortions will likewise put an undue burden on women.75 To 
properly determine whether the purpose or effect of a regulation is to 
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, 
the court must look to the purpose or effect that the regulation has in 
limiting the physician.76 
 Second, shifting the standard to evaluate both a physician’s ability 
to perform an abortion and a woman’s ability to seek an abortion is 
more fitting with the purpose of requiring informed consent.77 In-
formed consent is meant give the patient sufficient information to make 
an informed decision whether to undergo a treatment; it is not meant to 
limit the availability of treatment.78 By limiting the options of the patient 
and removing the opportunity to undergo or forgo a medical proce-
                                                                                                                      
72 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032–
34, 1044, 1046 (D. Neb. 2010). 
73 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000); Planned Parenthood of the Heart-
land, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1046. 
74 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164 (2007); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930, 936, 937. 
75 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930, 945–46 (“All those who perform abortion procedures 
using [the D&E] method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. The result 
is an undue burden upon a woman’s right to make an abortion decision.”); Planned Parent-
hood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1045, 1046. 
76 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945–46; Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 
1044, 1045, 1046. 
77 See Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 507, 508 (N.J. 1988). Informed consent stan-
dards fall primarily into two categories: a “professional” standard, in which the informa-
tion required is that which a reasonable physician would provide, or a “prudent patient” 
standard, in which the information required is that which a reasonable patient would have 
deemed material. Id. In jurisdictions employing the professional standard, physicians use 
their expertise to address only those risks that are appropriate. Id. at 507. The prudent 
patient standard, in contrast, defines the required disclosure of risks “not subjective as to 
either the physician or the patient [but] . . . objective with due regard for the patient’s in-
formational needs and with suitable leeway for the physician’s situation.” Id. at 508 (quot-
ing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
78 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1989); Largey, 540 A.2d at 
506; Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556–57 (Okla. 1980). 
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dure, the legislature dictates treatment under the guise of preventing 
physicians from doing so.79 Rigorous informed consent requirements 
that limit patient options do not remove the paternalism that informed 
consent was intended to counteract, but merely shift the decision even 
further outside the doctor-patient relationship to the legislature.80 Eval-
uating informed consent provisions for whether they place an undue 
burden on physicians or women is therefore consistent with the purpose 
of informed consent requirements in medical procedures.81 
 Courts have interpreted the undue burden standard set forth by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey as a limit on the methods a legislature may use to effect 
substantive policy goals by placing substantial obstacles before a woman 
seeking an abortion.82 Casey’s undue burden standard has proved both 
malleable and vague, however, leading to inconsistent results and am-
biguity.83 To more properly safeguard the constitutional right to abor-
tion under an undue burden standard, therefore, courts should ask 
whether a statute or regulation places an undue burden both on a 
woman seeking an abortion, and on physicians.84 
Conclusion 
 Because the burdens placed on physicians and the availability of 
abortion are so closely intertwined, courts should follow the lead of 
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland and evaluate undue burden on both 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269; Largey, 540 A.2d at 506; Scott, 606 P.2d at 556–57; see also 
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945–46 (holding that certain regulations on abortion providers would 
result in an undue burden on a woman’s right to make an abortion decision). 
80 See Robbins, supra note 13, at 158–59, 161, 163, 176; Roe, supra note 50, at 205–07. 
81 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-d(4)(a), (b) (McKinney 2007) (defenses to a 
medical malpractice action include that “the patient assured the . . . practitioner he would 
undergo the treatment . . . regardless of the risk involved, or the patient assured the . . . 
practitioner that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be enti-
tled to be informed”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.13(a)(2) (2010) (no recovery allowed 
where a “reasonable person, from the information provided by the health care provider 
under the circumstances, would have a general understanding of the procedures or treat-
ments and of the usual and most frequent risks and hazards inherent in the proposed pro-
cedures”); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406(3)(a)–(d) (LexisNexis 2008) (defenses for failure 
to obtain informed consent include that “the risk of the serious harm which the patient 
actually suffered was relatively minor”). 
82 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145, 146, 156; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930, 945–46. See generally 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
83 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 173–74, 181, 182, 186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 
U.S. at 985–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
84 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77; Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 
1032–34, 1044–46. 
2011 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland and the Burden on the Physician 241 
physicians and women to determine whether the regulation places a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Any 
burden placed on physicians will necessarily affect the availability of 
abortion procedures. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate the bur-
den on physicians under the same standard as that for women to de-
termine whether the purpose or effect of a legislative action is to place 
a substantial obstacle before a woman seeking an abortion. 
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